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NOTES
Plea Bargaining and
Collateral Consequences:
An Experimental Analysis
The overwhelming majority of convictions in the United States
are obtained through guilty pleas. Many of these guilty pleas are a
product of plea bargaining, where a defendant enters a guilty plea in
exchange for some form of official concessions. Despite its prominence,
plea bargaining is subject to limited regulation. One consequence of this
limited regulation is that courts generally only require the direct
consequences of a guilty plea to be communicated to a defendant. Thus,
when a defendant is deciding whether to plead guilty, he is often
operating with incomplete information about the costly collateral
consequences that may attach to a criminal conviction. The dominant
theory of plea bargaining suggests that outcomes will largely mirror trial
outcomes because bargaining occurs in the shadow of trial, but this may
not be accurate if failure to communicate collateral consequences
influences decisions to plead guilty.
Using an experiment, this Note examines the extent to which
communicating collateral consequences influences the decision to accept
a plea bargain. Results from the experiment demonstrate that
communicating collateral consequences decreases the rate of plea
acceptance, but the effect of communication dissipates as the difference
between the plea bargain sentence and the potential sentence at trial
grows larger. Because communicating collateral consequences has an
important effect on guilty pleas, this Note suggests that a lawyer’s failure
to communicate such consequences to their client should be grounds for
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the
world. Its incarceration rate is nearly seven percent higher than the
next closest country (El Salvador) and more than four times greater
than rates in Western Europe.1 At the end of 2016, an estimated 6.6
million people were under U.S. correctional system supervision.2 The
overwhelming majority of them came under correctional supervision
not after a trial, but after pleading guilty. Ninety-four to ninety-seven
percent of all convictions are obtained through guilty pleas.3
Despite their prominence, cases resolved by guilty pleas have
long been subject to limited regulation. While the Supreme Court has
increasingly regulated jury trials with exacting requirements, such as
requiring prosecutors to produce live witnesses and prove aggravating
1.
John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 2, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-incarceration-rate-isat-a-two-decade-low/ [https://perma.cc/YD25-DJYM].
2.
Danielle Kaeble & Mary Cowhig, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2016,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1 (Apr. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GES9-E28J].
3.
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 372
(2010) (noting that “[p]leas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions”).
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facts beyond a reasonable doubt, plea bargaining has remained
remarkably laissez faire.4 The Court’s hands-off approach to plea
bargaining is rooted in both practicality and theory. The judicial system
relies on guilty pleas to resolve the overwhelming majority of criminal
cases, so dampening the use of plea bargaining would be costly.5
Further, because defendants are presumed to plead based on expected
trial outcomes—the shadow of a trial theory—the Court has historically
assumed that innocent defendants will not plead guilty and outcomes
of any bargaining will be similar to trial outcomes because defendants’
rights are protected through jury trial procedures.6
Symptomatic of the free market approach to plea bargaining,
courts generally only require that the direct consequences of a guilty
plea be communicated to a defendant.7 When deciding whether to plead
guilty, individuals often operate with incomplete information about the
severity of the offer’s consequences. Defense attorneys are generally not
required to communicate collateral consequences, or costly nonpenal
sanctions that attach to a criminal conviction.8 Among these are
eviction from public housing, loss of voting rights, loss of professional
and occupational licenses, and denial of food stamps.9
4.
See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court has promulgated
exacting procedures to regulate jury trials . . . [b]ut even as trial procedures hypertrophied, plea
bargaining remained all but unregulated . . . .”).
5.
See Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970) (“A
reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the
judicial manpower and facilities—judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms.
A reduction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.”).
6.
See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“Defendants advised by
competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of
intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion [in the context of plea bargains], and
unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.”); Bibas, supra note 4, at 1124 (“Plea bargaining
supposedly takes place in the shadow of expected trial outcomes, so regulation of trials should
theoretically protect plea-bargaining defendants as well.”).
7.
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (holding plea bargaining
constitutional and requiring guilty pleas to be made with an understanding of all the direct
consequences of entering a guilty plea); see also Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364,
1366 (4th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing between direct and collateral consequences by examining
whether the consequence was a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of
the defendant’s punishment”); Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) (holding that the defense attorney’s failure to advise on an administrative punishment, in
addition to the criminal punishment, did not constitute ineffective assistance because it was not a
“definite practical consequence of the plea”).
8.
See Collateral Consequences Inventory, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVT’S JUST. CTR.,
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/database/results/?jurisdiction=&consequence_category=&narro
w_category=&triggtrigg_offense_category=&consequence_type=&duration_category=&page_num
ber=1 (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ZJ4Z-VZA6] (cataloguing potential collateral
consequences for convictions across jurisdictions, including loss of business licenses, removal from
political office, and ineligibility for various jobs).
9.
Id.
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If the theoretical underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s
approach to plea bargaining are sound—innocent defendants will not
plead guilty and outcomes will largely mirror trial outcomes—then the
lack of communication about collateral consequences is harmless. If,
however, the theoretical underpinnings are not sound, then the failure
to communicate important collateral consequences may influence
defendants’ decisions to accept or reject plea bargain offers, including
innocent defendants. Ultimately, this is an empirical question—one
which has not been satisfactorily answered. Despite the existence of
considerable scholarship related to factors influencing plea bargain
acceptance and the merits and effects of collateral consequences, there
has been little investigation of how the two interact.
Using an experiment, this Note examines the extent to which
communicating collateral consequences influences the decision to
accept a plea bargain that requires the defendant to plead guilty and
waive the right to trial. Specifically, it tests the effect of communicating
such consequences on decisions to plead guilty when the prosecutor has
offered a guaranteed sentence, as opposed to when the prosecutor offers
a recommended sentence or a defendant enters a guilty plea without
any bargaining agreement. Though the experiment directly tests the
effect of communicating collateral consequences on only a portion of
guilty pleas, the findings likely have implications for other types of
guilty pleas.
Part I provides background on plea bargaining, collateral
consequences, and the Supreme Court’s approach to plea bargaining.
Part II discusses and critiques the dominant theoretical justification for
plea bargaining: the shadow of a trial theory. Part III describes the
experiment used in this Note and presents the results demonstrating
the importance of communicating collateral consequences. Part IV
argues that, in light of the experimental results, defense counsel must
communicate collateral consequences to their clients.
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining, broadly defined, involves a defendant’s entry of
a guilty plea in exchange for some form of “official concessions.”10
Typically, these concessions take the form of a reduced sentence
imposed by the court, a reduced sentence recommended by the
10. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979) (“Plea
bargaining consists of the exchange of official concessions for a defendant’s act of self-conviction.”).
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prosecutor, or a reduction in the nature of the offense charged by the
prosecutor.11 Legal historians generally agree that the practice of plea
bargaining in the United States emerged during the early or midnineteenth century, became a standard feature of urban criminal courts
near the end of the nineteenth century, and grew substantially during
the twentieth century.12 Scholars offer numerous explanations for the
growth trajectory of plea bargaining practice in the country, including
(1) crowded court dockets;13 (2) pretrial detention;14 (3) lawyer
characteristics and incentives;15 (4) increasingly careful selection of
cases by police and prosecutors;16 (5) greater access to defense counsel;17
(6) increasingly cumbersome and time consuming jury trial
procedures;18 and (7) sentencing practices that made penalties at trial
more certain.19
Today, “plea bargaining is a defining, if not the defining, feature
of the present federal criminal justice system.”20 In 2017, consistent
with the last fifteen years, over ninety-seven percent of federal criminal

11. See id. at 3 & n.11 (explaining that other possible concessions include leniency to a
defendant’s accomplices, withholding damaging information from court, the date of trial, and
correctional institution placement, among others).
12. See id. at 19, 25–29, 34 (explaining that plea bargaining began appearing in appellate
court reports after the Civil War and grew in the twentieth century, particularly around
prohibition in the 1920s and in light of increasing caseloads in the 1960s); George Fisher, Plea
Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) (arguing that plea bargaining was common
by the 1920s); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 247, 248 (1979) (articulating that plea bargaining was present in the late 1800s, became
common in the 1920s and 1930s, and became prevalent in the 1950s).
13. E.g., Arnold Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW
ENF’T AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 112 (1967).
14. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 124 (2005) (“Because defendants who remain in detention before
trial are more anxious to resolve their cases, they plead guilty more often than defendants who are
released pending trial . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 199,
200 (1979) (referencing “the low quality of public defenders, the financial incentives of private
attorneys, [and] the laziness of prosecutors” as potential causes of increased plea bargaining).
16. See, e.g., Lynn M. Mather, Comments on the History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 281, 284 (1979) (“[W]hen cases undergo extensive pretrial screening before they reach court,
there are relatively few genuine disputes over guilt or innocence left to be resolved by juries.”).
17. See, e.g., Feeley, supra note 15, at 201 (“Ironically, the expanded use of defense counsel
may have sounded the death knell for the trial in all but a few cases.”)
18. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 10, at 41 (“For all the praise lavished upon the American
jury trial, this fact-finding mechanism has become so cumbersome and expensive that our society
refuses to provide it.”).
19. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 14, at 129 (“Changes in federal sentencing practices during
the 1980s and 1990s increased the certainty and size of the penalty for going to trial, and mightily
influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during those times.”)
20. Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives
on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006).
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cases were resolved through guilty pleas.21 The state level also has an
overwhelming number of convictions obtained via guilty plea, with
more than ninety-five percent of felony convictions resulting from such
pleas.22 These convictions consist of a combination of “straight up”
pleas23 and plea bargains,24 although the portions of each are unclear.25
While there are not precise estimates of the proportion of cases resolved
through plea bargaining, there is evidence that most are.26 Of offenders
who pleaded guilty in federal criminal cases in 2017, almost half
received sentences below the applicable sentencing guideline range,
and close to sixty percent of these lower sentences were requested by
the government.27
Although the prevalence of plea bargaining is undisputed, the
practice’s merits are widely debated. Proponents of the practice stress
its administrative convenience and argue that the outcomes are fair.28

21. Glenn R. Schmitt & Cassandra Syckes, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases: Fiscal Year
2017, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION 5 (June 2018) https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-publications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9E36-W9ZY].
22. See Sean Rosenmerkel, Mathew Durose & Donald Farole, Felony Sentences in State
Courts, 2006 – Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fssc06st.pdf (last updated Nov. 2010) [https://perma.cc/9E36-W9ZY].
23. See Mona Lynch, Booker Circumvention? Adjudication Strategies in the Advisory
Sentencing Guidelines Era, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 91 n.120 (2019) (“Pleading
‘straight up’ means that the defendant pleads guilty to the charges as they are presented in the
charging document, without entering into any plea agreement with the government.”).
24. See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 3 (explaining that, broadly defined, plea bargains involve
a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea in exchange for some form of “official concessions”).
25. See Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: The History and Psychology of Plea Bargaining
and the Trial Penalty, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 239, 239 (2019) (“Although the exact number of plea
bargains is elusive, it is estimated that approximately 75 percent of such pleas of guilty are induced
by threats of further punishment if a defendant proceeds to trial, by offers of leniency in return for
waiving the constitutionally protected right to trial, or both.”).
26. See Schmitt & Syckes, supra note 21, at 5 (examining the disposition of cases in 2017).
27. See id. (explaining that below-guideline sentences were typically requested “because the
defendant had provided substantial assistance to the government or had agreed to have his or her
case handled as part of an Early Disposition Program”).
28. See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice”, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
509, 512–14, 523 (1979) (referencing the “positive aspects of less formal adjudication procedures”);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309–17
(1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure] (extolling the virtues of plea bargains
because it enables “parties [to] save the costs of trials” and because “[d]efendants presumably
prefer the lower sentences to the exercise of their trial rights or they would not strike the deals”);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Compromise] (justifying plea bargaining because it “helps defendants”);
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66–69 (1971)
(theorizing that defendants only enter into plea bargains when it maximizes their utility); Edward
A. Ruttenburg, Plea Bargaining Analytically—The Nash Solution to the Landes Model, 7 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 323, 353 (1979) (“Plea bargaining should be accepted openly as a system which can
accomplish the goals of justice as completely as can a pure trial system . . . .”); Robert E. Scott &
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Opponents, on the other hand, contend that plea bargaining
undermines the accuracy and fairness of criminal prosecutions.29 This
Note focuses on one aspect of the plea bargaining system—the effect of
communicating collateral consequences during plea bargain
negotiations on decisions to waive trial and plead guilty—and explores
its theoretical and practical consequences for defendants.30
B. Collateral Consequences
Collateral consequences consist of a broad array of restrictions,
limitations, and barriers that—though not embedded in the criminal
code as part of the formal criminal penalty—individuals face as a result
of conviction.31 Some are imposed informally by third parties, such as
employers and potential landlords.32 This Note, however, focuses on the
many collateral consequences that are formally imposed by the
government and embedded throughout civil codes.33
The practice of imposing far-reaching, state-sanctioned
collateral consequences on individuals convicted of a crime is not a new
phenomenon. In 1937, eighteen states had “civil death” statutes that
severely restricted the civil rights of convicted persons after

William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (arguing that
plea bargains are “paradigmatically value-enhancing bargains.”).
29. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50 (1968) (decrying plea bargaining as producing irrational results); Bibas, supra note 4, at 1123
(criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to “cultivate rules tailored to make [plea] bargaining fair
and substantively just”).
30. See infra Parts II, III.
31. See Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 379 (2001) (explaining that states “impose a
wide range of disabilities on those who have been convicted of crimes, even after their release”);
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946) (recognizing that “[a] felon customarily suffers
the loss of substantial rights”); Natalie Goulette & James Frank, Examining Criminal Justice
Practitioners’ Views on Collateral Consequences Policy, 43 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 724, 725–26 (2018)
(“These additional restrictions can limit offenders’ civil, parental, and spousal rights.”).
32. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV 1103, 1104
(2013) (explaining that absent formal sanctions, “a conviction also has a very negative impact on
individuals’ job and housing prospects”); Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, 65
Million “Need Not Apply”: The Case for Reforming Criminal Background Checks for Employment,
NAT’L
EMP.
L.
PROJECT
(2011)
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/65
_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFD2-QHVS] (detailing the prevalence of hiring
limitations for individuals with criminal records). For a model of how informal sanctions function
in conjunction with the criminal justice system, see Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F.
Reinganum, Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal
Cases, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 359 (2015).
33. See generally Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 8 (consisting of an expansive,
searchable database categorizes collateral consequences by jurisdiction, the area of life affected,
the type of offense, and whether the law applies automatically or at the discretion of a government
agent). Examples of collateral consequences include ineligibility for federal benefits, revocation of
the right to vote, and loss of professional licensure. See id.
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incarceration, and additional states restricted some civil rights of
convicted persons without a formal statute.34 During the mid-twentieth
century, such laws became increasingly unpopular and less common; in
fact, in 1983, the American Bar Association predicted that collateral
sanctions were heading towards “extinction.”35 But that prediction
proved false. Even as severe civil death statutes became scarce,
collateral consequences were embedded in noncriminal statutes.36
Today, people convicted of felonies and most misdemeanors face
an expansive list of collateral consequences embedded “not in the penal
code but in state and federal gun-ownership and voting laws, jurorqualification standards, professional-licensure requirements, [and]
entitlement-eligibility rules.”37 The American Bar Association
Collateral Consequences Inventory contains close to forty-five thousand
consequences across U.S. jurisdictions.38 The more than one thousand
federally imposed collateral consequences include limits and outright
bans on access to federal housing,39 Social Security benefits,40 student
loans,41 and federal employment.42 State-level collateral consequences
are even more expansive—they include revocation of the right to vote,43
revocation or denial of professional and occupational licensures (for

34. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790, 1796 (2012) (articulating the concept of civil death as
more or less a complete extinction of civil rights).
35. Id. at 1798.
36. Id. at 1799. Although it is not entirely clear why civil death statutes were unpopular and
repealed while piecemeal collateral consequences provisions were simultaneously incorporated
into civil codes, the wholesale nature of civil death statutes may have made them particularly
prone to opposition while individual provisions appeared more proportionate to an offense.
37. Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in
American Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 145 (2008).
38. See Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 8.
39. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2019) (allowing for the termination of a PHA lease “for criminal
activity”). See generally Corrine A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied
Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545 (2005) (describing America’s exclusion of
individuals with criminal history from subsidized housing).
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2012) (providing for the denial of benefits based on specific drugrelated convictions).
41. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.40 (2019) (providing for ineligibility for federally backed student loans
for drug convictions).
42. See 5 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012) (providing for restrictions on federal employment for certain
bribery and drug-related convictions).
43. Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming all deny convicted felons the right to vote indefinitely. Felon
Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/4ADT-9YRL].
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example, a medical or barber’s license),44 ineligibility for food stamps,45
restrictions on adoption,46 and ineligibility for public office,47 among
innumerable others.48 Thus, the formal sanctions of a conviction are
only part of its cost. Often “collateral consequences . . . are the harshest
sanctions because they limit opportunity, can be timeless, and inhibit
full reentry.”49
Because courts generally regard collateral consequences as
nonpunitive, they “have imposed few limits on creation and
implementation of collateral consequences.”50 The Supreme Court has
condoned collateral consequences related to occupational ineligibility,51
deportation,52 sex offender registrations,53 civil commitment,54 voter

44. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 626A.20 (2018) (providing for the suspension or revocation of licenses
“to practice a profession or to carry on a business” for certain communications-related convictions);
W. VA. CODE § 21-1B-7 (2018) (providing for the suspension or revocation of professional and
occupational licenses for convictions of fraud and labor laws).
45. E.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.04.287 (2018) (restricting food stamp eligibility for
drug-related felonies); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-308 (2018) (restricting food stamp eligibility for
drug-related convictions).
46. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-19.7 (2019) (providing for denial of adoption application based
on criminal conviction); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-26.8 (West 2019) (restricting eligibility for
adoption based on criminal convictions).
47. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.317 (2018) (preventing individuals convicted of crimes involving
fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation, or money-laundering from holding public office); 17 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 17-23-6 (2018) (preventing individuals convicted of election-related offenses from holding
public office).
48. See Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 8 (providing a comprehensive listing
of collateral consequences by jurisdiction).
49. Brian M. Murray, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1031,
1032 (2020).
50. Chin, supra note 34, at 1806; see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69
(1963) (establishing a balancing test to determine if a law is criminal punishment or civil
regulation); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195–98 (1898) (holding that a provision
prohibiting those convicted of a felony from holding a medical license was not ex post facto criminal
punishment, but merely made use of conviction of a felony as evidence for disqualification).
51. See Hawker, 170 U.S. at 197–200 (“[S]uch legislation is not to be regarded as a mere
imposition of additional penalty, but as prescribing the qualifications for the duties to be
discharged and the position to be filled, and naming . . . appropriate evidence of such
qualifications.”).
52. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause
does not apply to deportation because it is not punitive even if it “deprive[s] a man ‘of all that
makes life worth living’ ” (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922))).
53. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104–06 (2003) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does
not apply to sex offender registration because the statute requiring registration was regulatory,
civil, and nonpunitive).
54. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause
did not apply to involuntary confinement after conviction for indecent liberties with a child because
the statute was not punitive).
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disenfranchisement,55 and firearm possession.56 Subjecting collateral
consequences to rational basis review, lower courts have upheld
collateral consequences on cost-saving,57 public safety,58 and public
confidence59 grounds. Collateral consequences thus represent a
widespread, court-sanctioned, and costly result of conviction, but when
defendants are considering entering a guilty plea, such consequences
need not be communicated to them.
C. The Supreme Court, Plea Bargaining,
and Collateral Consequences
Despite the Supreme Court’s promulgation of exacting
procedures for jury trials, the Court’s approach towards plea bargaining
has remained quite deferential.60 In the seminal case on plea
bargaining, the 1970 Brady v. United States decision, the Supreme
Court held that plea bargaining was constitutional.61 It recognized that
the government “encourages pleas of guilty at every important step in
the criminal process” and refused to hold that a guilty plea is compelled
and invalid when motivated by a defendant’s desire to accept the
certainty of a lesser penalty rather than risk a heavier sentence at
trial.62 The Court highlighted the mutual benefits of plea bargaining for
defendants and for the government: defendants with little chance of
acquittal are relieved of the “burdens of trial” and “the correctional
55. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–55 (1974) (finding that loss of voting rights
related to felony conviction was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
56. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (noting that “nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons”).
57. See Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the
conservation of funds constitutes a rational basis on which to deny assistance to convicted felons
and sex offenders”).
58. See Rinehart v. La. Dep’t of Corr., No. 93-5624, 1994 WL 395054, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7,
1994) (per curiam) (holding that employment prohibitions are rationally related to security and
safety).
59. See Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that an Illinois statute
restricting felons from elected office is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in ensuring
public confidence in elected officials).
60. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 1119 (“[T]he Supreme Court has promulgated exacting
procedures to regulate jury trials. . . . But even as trial procedures hypertrophied, plea bargaining
remained all but unregulated, a free market that sometimes resembled a Turkish bazaar.”).
61. See 397 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1970):
[Plea bargaining] is inherent in the criminal law and its administration because guilty
pleas are not constitutionally forbidden, because the criminal law characteristically
extends to judge or jury a range of choice in setting the sentence in individual cases,
and because both the State and the defendant often find it advantageous to preclude
the possibility of the maximum penalty authorized by law.
62. Id. at 750–51.
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process can begin immediately,” while the government can allocate
limited resources to cases in which there “is a substantial issue of the
defendant’s guilt.”63
Because guilty pleas constitute a waiver of the constitutional
right to trial, due process requires judges to ensure that pleas are
intelligent and voluntary.64 The bar for what constitutes a voluntary
and intelligent guilty plea is low, however. In Brady, the Court
concluded that judges’ due process obligations are met when they
ensure that defendants understand the “direct consequences” of
entering a guilty plea and do not face threats, misrepresentations, or
bribes.65 Thus, at plea colloquies, judges must “explain only the direct
consequences of a plea, such as the minimum and maximum sentences
and any fine, forfeiture, or probation.”66 Further, the Court
subsequently held that prosecutorial threats to bring more severe
charges if a defendant rejects a plea offer do not vitiate the
voluntariness of a guilty plea because there is no “element of
punishment or retaliation” in the “give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense.”67 And, as
recently as 2002, in United States v. Ruiz, the Court determined there
is no constitutional due process right to impeachment and affirmative
defense information during plea bargaining.68
Additionally, in contrast with trial practice, the Court has
routinely upheld the waivability of rights in the plea bargaining
63. Id. at 752.
64. See id. at 748 (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.”); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969) (finding that a trial judge may
not accept a guilty plea “without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary”).
65. 397 U.S. at 755 (adopting the Fifth Circuit standard):
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship
to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).
(quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on other
grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
66. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1130; see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (adopting the standard that
a defendant need only be made aware of the plea’s “direct consequences” (quoting Shelton, 246
F.2d at 572 n.2)). The Rule 11 plea process builds on constitutional requirements for guilty pleas
established in Brady and Boykin, requiring that during plea colloquies the judge need mention
only the rights being waived, the nature of the charges, the maximum and minimum penalties,
and some factual basis for the plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (establishing the federal model for plea
bargaining, which is followed by many states).
67. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–63 (1978) (quoting Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)).
68. See 536 U.S. 622, 629–30 (2002).
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context. In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Court emphasized the
strong presumption that all rights are waivable in plea bargaining.69
More recently, in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington,
the Court held that facts admitted by defendants who plead guilty are
exempt from the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the jury find all
facts that aggravate maximum sentences and sentences under
sentencing guidelines.70 In fact, “[m]ost guilty pleas forfeit most rights
that defendants could otherwise appeal,” and “[d]efendants often waive”
additional rights, including “the right to appeal itself.”71 Defendants
must merely be informed of the rights they are waiving.72
In theory, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel helps
ensure that defendants make knowing, intelligent guilty pleas.73 The
same year Brady was decided (1970), in McMann v. Richardson, the
Court held that defendants have a right to competent legal advice
regarding guilty pleas.74 Although the Court explained that effective
assistance of counsel is based on whether the actions and conduct of an
attorney came “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases,” it did not provide guidance on what this standard
means in a guilty plea context.75 Lacking guidance, lower courts
developed and relied on a test incorporating the “direct consequences”
language in Brady. Courts distinguished between direct and collateral
consequences and held that when counsel advise defendants on the
direct and automatic consequences of a guilty plea, they satisfy the
effective counsel requirement.76
69. See 513 U.S. 196, 200–03 (1995) (holding that defendants may waive rules that exclude
from evidence statements made during plea negotiations).
70. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004) (extending Apprendi to facts that
aggravate sentences under sentencing guidelines and emphasizing that defendants can waive
Apprendi rights in plea bargaining); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488–90 (2000)
(exempting facts admitted by defendants from its holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees
jury findings of all facts that aggravate maximum sentences).
71. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1123; see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575–76 (1989)
(holding that a guilty plea barred a later double jeopardy claim that relied on additional evidence);
People v. Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 1024–26 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing waiver of the right to appeal).
72. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 1124 (“[D]efendants need know only that they are giving up
their trial rights.”).
73. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
74. See 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (holding that “a defendant’s plea of guilty based on
reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel
may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession”).
75. Id. at 771.
76. See, e.g., Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973)
(distinguishing between direct and collateral consequences by examining whether the consequence
was a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s
punishment”); Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding
that the defense attorney’s failure to advise on an administrative punishment, in addition to the
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In 1985, the Court extended the two-pronged test for ineffective
counsel, first developed as a trial right in Strickland v. Washington, to
guilty pleas.77 Strickland provides a two-pronged test for ineffective
assistance claims: (1) whether “counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) whether counsel’s
“deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”78 Under the first prong,
reasonableness is considered in relation to “prevailing professional
norms” such as the American Bar Association standards.79 Under the
second prong, there is prejudice when “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”80
In the case extending Strickland to guilty pleas, Hill v. Lockhart,
the Court clarified that there is prejudice in the plea context when there
is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.”81 Because the Hill defendant failed to satisfy the
prejudice prong, the Court did not address the question of
reasonableness in the plea context.82 And overwhelmingly, lower courts
continued to apply the test distinguishing between direct and collateral
consequences in determinations of ineffective assistance of counsel.83
In a watershed decision in 2010, the Court directly confronted
the issue of counsel’s duty to advise clients about the possible
consequences of a guilty plea.84 In Padilla v. Kentucky, the defendant,
a U.S. permanent resident, was charged with felony trafficking in
marijuana.85 He asked his lawyer whether pleading guilty would lead
to deportation and was incorrectly assured that he need not worry about
deportation.86 The Court held that, before a guilty plea, defense counsel

criminal punishment, did not constitute ineffective assistance because it was not a “definite
practical consequence of the plea”).
77. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to guilty pleas);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (determining whether counsel was
ineffective based on (1) whether “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and (2) whether counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense”).
78. 466 U.S. at 687–88.
79. Id. at 690.
80. Id. at 694.
81. 474 U.S. at 59.
82. Id. at 60.
83. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) (explaining that “eleven federal
circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia” still rely on the distinction between
direct and collateral consequences).
84. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
85. Id. at 359.
86. Id.
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must advise clients about the civil collateral consequence of deportation
to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.87 In reaching
this decision, the Court emphasized the “weight of prevailing
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her
client regarding the deportation risk” and the ease of determining the
consequence of deportation.88
Although the Court noted that it had “never applied a distinction
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance,’ ” it delayed
consideration of whether the distinction is appropriate because
“deportation is intimately related to the criminal process.”89 Since
issuing the decision in Padilla, however, the Court has not revisited
this question or extended the requirement to communicate other
collateral consequences. Lower courts therefore continue to apply the
direct/collateral consequences distinction.90
The Supreme Court, however, recently extended additional plea
bargain protections in a related area. In Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri
v. Frye, a pair of 2012 decisions, the Court considered whether a
defendant’s right to counsel was violated when the defendant received
deficient advice during pretrial plea bargaining that led to severe
consequences.91 The majority affirmed a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel during pretrial negotiations,
focusing on the Strickland prejudice test and casting further doubt on
the continued use of the test distinguishing collateral and direct
consequences used by most lower courts.92 Importantly, in rendering
the decision in Frye, the Court explicitly denounced the notion that
regulated jury trials provide adequate protection for defendants at the
plea negotiation stage, stating:
Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions
are the result of guilty pleas . . . The reality is that plea bargains have become so central
to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have

87. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
88. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357.
89. Id. at 357, 365.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty
plea is valid when the defendant was unaware of the collateral consequence of civil commitment);
United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty plea is valid
where defendants are unaware of collateral consequences such as the loss of benefits).
91. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 138–39 (2012) (noting that defendant’s counsel neglected
to communicate a plea offer proposed by the prosecution to the defendant and the Supreme Court
found that counsel has an effective assistance of counsel duty to communicate such offers); Lafler
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 161–68 (2012) (stating that defendant went to trial and was convicted
after counsel advised against accepting a plea offer “on the grounds he could not be convicted at
trial,” which the Court deemed ineffective assistance of counsel).
92. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 147–49; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 166–67.
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responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render
the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal
process at critical stages. Because ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system
of trials,’ it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.93

Thus, although the Court has historically treated plea
bargaining as outside the scope of many constitutional protections
afforded to defendants during jury trials, recently it has begun taking
steps to provide greater protections to defendants convicted through
plea bargaining.
II. A REALITY CHECK ON THE DOMINANT THEORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
A. The Shadow of a Trial Theory
In part, the Court’s hands-off approach to plea bargaining
reflects an underlying “shadow of a trial” theory that mirrors
settlement theory in civil cases. Conventional settlement theory posits
that litigants bargain toward settlement in the shadow of expected trial
outcomes.94 The basic model predicts that rational parties forecast the
expected outcome of a trial and reach a bargain that leaves both sides
better off by splitting the saved costs of trial.95 For example, a tort
plaintiff who suffered $100,000 in damages and anticipates that they
have a seventy-five percent chance of winning at trial would be willing
to settle for $75,000 minus the expected expense of going to trial. The
defendant in the case, meanwhile, may anticipate that the plaintiff has
a seventy percent chance of winning at trial and will be willing to settle
for $70,000 plus the expected costs of trial. Assuming the costs of going
to trial are $3,000, the parties can settle for between $75,000 − $3,000
and $70,000 + $3,000, or $72,000 and $73,000.

93. Frye, 566 U.S. at 143–44 (citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
95. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2464 (2004). Priest & Klein, supra note 94, at 11–13, provide a detailed model of the settlement
decision. At its most basic, two parties will settle when the plaintiff’s minimum ask, A, is less than
the defendant’s maximum offer, B. 𝐴 = 𝑃 𝐽 − 𝐶 + 𝑆 , where 𝑃 (𝐽) is the plaintiff’s expected value
of the case (the plaintiff’s estimated probability of a favorable judgement multiplied by the size of
the judgement, J), 𝐶 is the litigation cost to the plaintiff, and 𝑆 is the settlement cost to the
plaintiff. Similarly, 𝐵 = 𝑃 (𝐽) + 𝐶 − 𝑆 , where 𝑃 (𝐽) is the defendant’s expected costs of the case
(the defendant’s estimated probability of a favorable judgement for the plaintiff multiplied by the
size of the judgement), 𝐶 is the litigation cost to the defendant, and 𝑆 is the settlement cost to
the defendant. Thus, the parties will settle when 𝑃 (𝐽) − 𝐶 + 𝑆 < 𝑃 (𝐽) + 𝐶 − 𝑆 .
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The same theoretical framework has been adapted to the
criminal context.96 A number of scholars have argued that plea
bargaining is simply another iteration of bargaining in the shadow of a
trial.97 In the criminal context, the prosecutor and defendant forecast
the expected outcome of going to trial and reach a bargain when the
prosecutor’s sentence offer is lower than the defendant’s expected
sentence at trial.98 The prosecutor’s minimum sentence demand is
determined by the product of the sentence upon conviction at trial and
the anticipated likelihood of obtaining a conviction. The maximum
sentence a defendant will be willing to accept is similarly determined
by the product of the sentence upon conviction at trial and his
anticipated likelihood of being convicted (excluding any monetary costs
present when a defendant is paying his own legal expenses). When the
maximum sentence a defendant is willing to accept is longer than the
prosecutor’s minimum sentence demand, a bargain may be reached.99
In an effort to minimize postconviction sanctions, a defendant will
weigh the expected sentence at trial—the product of the expected
sentence at trial and the perceived likelihood of conviction—against the
deal offered by the prosecutor.100
For example, consider a defendant charged with a crime that
carries a ten-year potential sentence. If the prosecutor perceives a fifty
percent chance of winning at trial, making the expected sentence at
trial five years (.5 x 10 years), he would be willing to offer the defendant
a plea bargain for between five and ten years. If the defendant perceives
a 70 percent chance of being convicted at trial, making the expected
sentence at trial seven years (.7 x 10 years), he would be willing to
accept a plea bargain for any sentence less than seven years. Thus, the
prosecutor and defendant may strike a deal for a sentence between five
and seven years. As the likelihood of conviction at trial decreases, the
discount offered in a plea bargain must increase to incentivize a
defendant to accept the offer. Continuing the previous example, if the
defendant anticipates a thirty percent chance of conviction, he will not
accept a plea bargain that involves more than a three-year sentence.

96. For a critical account of the functional differences between settlements in the civil and
criminal contexts, see Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing
Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (2017) (noting that “[t]he civil system facilitates
settlement in a very different way” than the criminal system).
97. See, e.g., Church, supra note 28, at 512–14, 523; Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra
note 28, at 309–17; Easterbrook, Compromise, supra note 28, at 1969–72; Ruttenburg, supra note
28, at 353; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 28, at 1910.
98. See Bibas, supra note 95, at 2464–66.
99. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 297.
100. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1119; Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 297.
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But, if he anticipates a ninety percent chance of conviction, he will
accept any offer for less than nine years.
Importantly, proponents of the shadow of a trial theory endorse
plea bargains because they expect the resulting plea bargains roughly
to reflect the outcomes that would occur at trial, therefore ensuring that
plea bargains allocate punishment fairly.101 They contend that strict
regulation of plea bargaining is unnecessary because highly regulated
trials serve as the backdrop for plea negotiations and are thus
incorporated into the negotiations.102 A defendant considering a plea
bargain theoretically bases his perceived chance of conviction on the
chance of conviction in a highly regulated, fair trial, and thus he should
not be willing to accept an offer that deviates greatly from that
perceived chance of conviction.103 Proponents also argue that plea
bargains calibrate sentences to culpability, allow prosecutors to pursue
the most dangerous criminals, and more effectively mirror trial
outcomes than settlements in civil cases because sentencing is more
predictable.104
There are reasons to doubt that this model accurately reflects
reality, however. It assumes that individuals act rationally and on the
basis of complete information, but psychologists and behavioral
economists have amassed evidence that people—including
professionals in the criminal justice system—fail to act in strictly
rational ways.105 Further, in the name of simplification, the model
excludes many factors that are important in the decision to plead guilty
and waive trial, such as poor lawyering, agency costs, and bail and
pretrial detention rules.106 Consequently, some scholars have criticized

101. Bibas, supra note 4, at 1124–25.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 95, at 2496–2526 (discussing the psychological pitfalls in plea
bargaining); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (demonstrating that judges are susceptible to anchoring, framing,
hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, and egocentric biases that produce systematic
errors in judgement); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (explaining the biases leading to use of
representativeness, availability, and adjustment and anchoring heuristics). Proponents of the
shadow of a trial theory sometimes acknowledge the theory’s shortcomings, but often in passing
and without due consideration of the consequences of its shortcomings. See Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedure, supra note 98, at 309–17 (acknowledging market failure challenges to plea bargaining,
such as risk preferences, time discounting, financial limitations, and agency costs, but dismissing
them as relatively unimportant); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 28, at 1925–28, 1938–39
(acknowledging some important caveats, such as framing, poor judgement, and risk preferences,
but dismissing them).
106. See Bibas, supra note 95, at 2469–96 (discussing the structural distortions in plea
bargaining).
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the shadow of a trial theory for failing to accurately explain observed
plea bargaining behavior; these scholars argue that a nontrivial portion
of guilty pleas are entered by factually innocent defendants.107 As
discussed below, the failure to communicate collateral consequences to
defendants creates both structural and behavioral problems for the
shadow of the trial theory and suggests that failure to communicate
such consequences distorts outcomes.
B. Reality Check on the Shadow of a Trial Theory
The Supreme Court’s decision not to require communication of
collateral consequences violates the assumptions of the shadow of a
trial theory because it enables uninformed and irrational plea
acceptances. Assuming the shadow of a trial theory of plea bargaining
is appropriate, complete information about the costs of entering a guilty
plea is necessary for defendants to appropriately weigh the merits of
accepting an offer and going to trial.108 But even assuming a defendant
has some knowledge of collateral consequences, failure to disclose them
during plea bargaining negotiations implicates psychological and
behavioral economic departures from rational decisionmaking because
individuals generally are loss averse, give priority to salient
information, and frame decisions narrowly.109
107. See David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 200, 220 (2011) (using administrative data to determine that the value of a plea
deal is typically worse than the expected trial outcome); John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The
Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 175–
80 (2014) (providing several reasons why innocent defendants enter guilty pleas); Vanessa A.
Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Freedom Now or a Future Later: Pitting the Lasting Implications of
Collateral Consequences Against Pretrial Detention in Decisions to Plead Guilty, 24 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 204, 205 (2018) [hereinafter Edkins & Dervan, Freedom] (testing whether the shadow
of a trial theory describes defendant decisions using a vignette study); Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian
E. Dervan, Pleading Innocents: Laboratory Evidence of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 21
CURRENT RES. IN SOC. PSYCHOL. 14, 18 (2013) [hereinafter Edkins & Dervan, Pleading Innocents]
(finding in an experiment that fifty-six percent of innocent participants preferred accepting a plea
deal); Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts,
89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 299–300 (1975) (finding that more than two-thirds of marginal plea bargain
defendants would be acquitted or dismissed if they were to contest their cases). But see Shawn D.
Bushway & Allison D. Redlich, Is Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” a Mirage?, 28 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 437 (2012) (finding that the theory was supported by evidence
combining statistical modelling with trial evidence to determine whether plea bargained cases
would have had harsher outcomes at trial).
108. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 297 (discussing negotiations
between the prosecutor and the defendant).
109. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (describing violations of assumptions of
neoclassical economics due to bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower
and introducing behavioral approaches to law and economics); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND.
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1. Incomplete Information
The shadow of a trial theory of plea bargaining assumes that
defendants have the requisite information needed to determine
whether the cost-minimizing course of action is going to trial or
pleading guilty.110 When only the immediate, direct consequences of a
conviction are communicated to defendants, they are likely to
miscalculate the cost of pleading guilty to that offense.111 For example,
consider a defendant facing a ten-year sentence if convicted at trial. If
he anticipates a fifty percent chance of conviction at trial, the true
expected cost of going to trial is a five-year sentence (.5 x 10 years) and
the discounted cost of collateral consequences (.5 x the cost of collateral
consequences). If the prosecutor offers him a plea bargain for a fouryear sentence, the true cost of the offer is the four-year sentence and
the total cost of collateral consequences. Without information about the
costly consequences of collateral sanctions, the defendant cannot
appropriately weigh the relative merits of the two options and will
underestimate the cost of a guilty plea. Consequently, even assuming a
rational model is appropriate, failure to communicate collateral
consequences to defendants distorts the shadow of a trial theory.
2. Irrational Decisionmaking
Failure to communicate collateral consequences to defendants
also implicates deviations from the rationality assumptions of the
shadow of a trial theory. Behavioral law and economics concepts of loss
aversion, salience, and narrow framing all suggest that the shadow of a
trial theory of plea bargaining may neglect important considerations
relevant to the communication of collateral consequences.112
L. REV. 1499 (1998) (providing an overview of the legal literature incorporating behavioral
economic and psychology concepts).
110. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 28, at 297 (discussing negotiations
between the prosecutor and the defendant).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty
plea was valid when the defendant was unaware of the collateral consequence of civil
commitment); United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty
plea is valid even though the defendant was unaware of collateral consequences such as the loss
of benefits); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing
between direct and collateral consequences by examining whether the consequence was a “definite,
immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment”); Hutchison
v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding that the defense
attorney’s failure to advise on an administrative punishment, in addition to the criminal
punishment, did not constitute ineffective assistance because it was not a “definite practical
consequence of the plea”).
112. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) (discussing loss aversion); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel
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A critical insight of psychology and behavioral economics is that
most people are loss averse, and often avoiding loss is more important
to individuals than avoiding risk.113 Consequently, when making
decisions under risk, individuals tend to be risk seeking with regard to
losses and risk averse with regard to gains.114 With respect to plea
bargaining, this suggests that a defendant who is weighing the sure
losses associated with a guilty plea against the risky option of trial will
prefer the latter. But, behavior is sensitive to both the degree of risk
and the framing of a risky decision. In situations where there is a
chance of an extremely large loss, individuals appear to prefer certain,
smaller costs instead of risking the realization of the extreme loss.115 If
the cost of conviction at trial is extremely high compared with the plea
offer, defendants may instead accept the plea bargain despite the sure
loss. Again, without communication of collateral consequences,
however, the defendant is likely misperceiving the costs of pleading
guilty as lower than they are. If collateral consequences are
communicated, the perceived difference between trial outcomes and
plea acceptance may shrink and result in the defendant choosing trial.
Further, because individuals prefer certain outcomes with regard to
gains, if a plea bargain is framed as a gain, defendants are likely to be
more prone to accept the offer.116 Thus, when a plea bargain is framed
as the benefit of fewer years of incarceration as opposed to being framed
with regard to the costly collateral consequences after release because
those consequences are not communicated, defendants may be more
likely to accept a plea offer.
The concepts of salience and narrow framing also provide
important insights for plea bargaining decisions. Salience refers to the
observation that individuals are more likely to focus on items or
information that are more prominent and ignore those that are less so,
creating a bias in favor of things that are striking and perceptible.117
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S258 (1986)
[hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice] (discussing loss aversion).
113. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 105.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 274–85 (discussing risk theory); see also Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 279–80, 300 (1948) (noting that
generalizations about risk aversion hold true for moderate degrees of risk, but perhaps not small
or large risks); Marieke Huysentruyt & Daniel Read, How Do People Value Extended Warranties?
Evidence from Two Field Surveys, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 197 (2010) (explaining decisions to
purchase expensive warranties as an insurance policy against an extreme loss).
116. See Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 112, at S254–60 (demonstrating
that framing decisions as gains induces individuals to favor certain outcomes over equivalent
uncertain outcomes).
117. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 105 (discussing the heuristics “employed to assess
probabilities and predict values”). See generally Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience
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Narrow framing refers to the observation that individuals often
consider decisions in isolation, rather than as a part of the bigger
picture, and consequently fail to make the most advantageous
combination of choices.118 With respect to collateral consequences,
salience suggests that defendants are unlikely to consider collateral
consequences when they are not explicitly disclosed even if they have
some preexisting knowledge of the consequences. And, because the
salient factor during plea negotiations is the sentence or charge,
defendants may narrowly frame jail time and collateral consequences
as individual decisions, rather than part of the whole, in deciding
whether to accept a plea bargain. Thus, even assuming defendants are
acting from a place of complete information—admittedly a bold
assumption—failing to communicate collateral consequences may
result in deviations from the shadow of a trial theory, leading to
inaccurate or unfair results.
III. AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF PLEA BARGAINING
AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Experiment Design and Hypotheses
1. Experiment Design
Although there is abundant scholarship on plea bargaining and
collateral consequences considered separately,119 and some scholarship
considering the relationship between the two,120 empirical research on

and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145 (2009) (demonstrating that
individuals are more sensitive to taxes when they are included in the posted price of a good rather
than assessed at the register).
118. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 334–41 (2011) (explaining that
individuals make individual decisions rather than in the aggregate to maximize utility and that
such narrow framing results in deviations from rational utility maximization); Tversky &
Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 112, at S255–56 (demonstrating that individuals will
choose strictly dominated sets of options when presented separately).
119. E.g., Bibas, supra note 95; Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999); Michael
Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and
Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006); Meghan
Sacks & Alissa R. Ackerman, Pretrial Detention and Guilty Pleas: If They Cannot Afford Bail They
Must Be Guilty, 25 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 265 (2012).
120. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 83 (contending that effective assistance of counsel should
require communicating collateral consequences); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss:
Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV.
119, 167–93 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should require communication of collateral
consequences to protect the personal values that underlie a defendant’s decision whether to plead
guilty and because such consequences overshadow direct penal sentences in criminal cases).
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the relationship between the two is quite undeveloped.121 One reason
for the dearth of empirical work is the absence of instructive
observational data related to plea bargaining and collateral
consequences. In the absence of observational data, this Note employs
an experimental vignette study designed to elicit the effect of
communicating collateral consequences on the decision to accept a plea
bargain.122
The vignette study developed for this Note expands on the work
of Edkins and Dervan (2018), who found that communicating collateral
consequences—loss of voting rights and loss of professional licensure—
did not affect decisions to plead guilty when the plea bargain involved
no prison time.123 Like their study, each scenario in the present
experiment revolves around a nurse charged with felony assault. This
characterization is desirable for several reasons. First, felony
convictions often carry collateral consequences that misdemeanor
convictions do not. Second, loss of professional licensure is a common
collateral consequence of felony conviction. And, third, felony assault
carries potential sentences between one and twenty years—depending
on the jurisdiction and the circumstances surrounding the crime—and
therefore provides a realistic range of potential sentences. In contrast
to the Edkins and Dervan study, this experiment tests the importance
of collateral consequences in a situation where a plea bargain involves
jail time, includes a more robust set of collateral consequences
(including the loss of public benefits), and asks respondents to consider
accepting a plea bargain in relation to increasingly severe sentences if
convicted at trial.

121. See Edkins & Dervan, Freedom, supra note 107 (using an experimental vignette study to
test the effects of communicating collateral consequences on plea acceptance. The author’s vignette
study involved a single nurse charged with felony assault, a plea bargain involving no jail time,
and communication about collateral consequences related to loss of voting rights and professional
licensure); see also Stephanie Madon et al., Temporal Discounting: The Differential Effect of
Proximal and Distal Consequences on Confession Decisions, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 13 (2011)
(finding in an experiment that participants altered how frequently they admitted to criminal
behaviors during an interview to “avoid a proximal consequence even though doing so increased
their risk of incurring a distal consequence”).
122. Experimental-vignette studies have become increasingly common in the legal literature
to test whether inter- and intra-subject responses meaningfully differ across scenarios involving
an issue of interest. See Christiane Atzmüller & Peter M. Steiner, Experimental Vignette Studies
in Survey Research, 6 METHODOLOGY 128 (2010) (defining vignette experiments and describing
their utility).
123. Edkins & Dervan, Freedom, supra note 107 (using an experimental vignette study to test
the effects of communicating collateral consequences on plea acceptance. The author’s vignette
study involved a single nurse charged with felony assault, a plea bargain involving no jail time,
and communication about collateral consequences related to loss of voting rights and professional
licensure).
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Experimental subjects in the study were recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) service.124 Subjects were compensated $0.70
for about five minutes of their time. To ensure that participants were
attentive during the experiment, the survey included an attention
check question at the end and subjects who answered incorrectly were
dropped from the sample used for analysis. Table 1 presents selected
demographics of the final sample of 316 subjects who participated in
the study. The sample was 62% male and 61% white. The average age
of subjects was slightly under thirty-five. Forty-four percent of subjects
had a household income of over $50,000. More than half of participants
had a bachelor’s degree or higher education level. Sixteen percent of
subjects reported that they had been arrested or charged with a crime,
and 42% reported knowing somebody who has been charged with a
felony. Three quarters of participants believe that criminal sentencing
needs reform.
TABLE 1: SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable
Age
Male
White
Income over $50k
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher
Arrested/Charged with a Crime
Know a Felon
Sentencing Reform Needed

Mean
34.6
0.62
0.61
0.44
0.63
0.16
0.42
0.75

The study presented all subjects with the same basic underlying
vignette. Subjects assumed the role of a single nurse charged with
felony assault, who is not being detained before trial and is offered a
plea deal involving a guaranteed three-month sentence.125 Each subject
was randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) guilty and no
124. For a detailed discussion on the use of mTurk samples in legal decisionmaking studies,
see David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595 (2016).
125. Although most plea deals involve a recommended sentence, making the plea outcome less
than one hundred percent certain, I chose to use a guaranteed sentence (similar to Edkins and
Dervan). Using a guaranteed sentence prevents introducing differing perceptions about the
likelihood of the recommendation being followed in respondent’s decisions. Concerns about the
generalizability of findings to recommended sentences are mitigated by research finding that the
greatest predictor of a judge’s sentence is the recommendation of the prosecutor. See Eugenio
Garrido Martín & Carmen Herrero Alonso, Influence of the Prosecutor’s Plea on the Judge’s
Sentencing in Sexual Crimes: Hypothesis of the Theory of Anchoring by Tversky and Kahneman, in
ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 215–26 (Redondo et al. eds.,
1997).
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communication of collateral consequences, (2) guilty and
communication of collateral consequences, (3) not guilty and no
communication of collateral consequences, or (4) not guilty and
communication of collateral consequences. Subjects assigned to one of
the conditions in which collateral consequences were communicated
were told that as a consequence of pleading guilty to the offense they
would lose the right to vote, lose their nursing license, and no longer be
eligible for federal benefits such as foods stamps and public housing.
After reading the vignette, subjects were asked whether they
would accept the proposed plea bargain when the sentence if convicted
at trial was one, three, six, or ten years. After each decision, subjects
were asked to state how confident they were in their decision on a scale
from 0 to 100 percent. In all scenarios, after making decisions about
whether to accept the plea bargain at each sentence level, subjects were
asked to rank factors that contributed to their decisions on a scale of
one to five, where one represented no consideration and five
represented great importance. The five factors that the subjects ranked
were: their guilt or innocence, the length of jail time, the desire to put
the issue behind them, the chance of losing their nursing license, and
the chance of losing other benefits.
At the end of the survey, subjects were asked about demographic
information, including age, gender, race and ethnicity, household
income, and educational background. Additionally, subjects were asked
whether they regularly drive more than ten miles per hour over the
speed limit, whether they have been arrested or charged with a crime,
whether they know anyone who has been charged with a felony, and
whether they think that criminal sentencing needs reform. The
speeding question was intended to act as a proxy for risk preferences.
The questions about personal criminal history and acquaintance
criminal history were intended to act as proxies for familiarity with the
criminal justice system. And the question about sentencing reform was
intended to elicit underlying beliefs about the criminal justice system.
A sample of the complete survey is included in the Appendix.126

126. One commentator suggested that the language used to convey the imposition of collateral
consequences (“As a consequence of pleading guilty to the offense you will lose your right to vote,
will lose your nursing license, and will no longer be eligible for federal benefits such as foods [sic]
stamps and public housing”) may have caused some respondents to believe that the consequences
only attached if they pleaded guilty, not if they were found guilty at trial. It is possible that some
respondents did so, and results may be overstated if they did. Extensive pre-testing and review of
the survey, however, mitigate such concerns. About thirty individuals—comprised of individuals
with legal expertise and those without such expertise—participated in taking an earlier version of
the experiment and provided feedback without raising such concerns. An additional ten
individuals pre-tested the current survey and provided feedback, similarly without raising such
concerns.
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Though the survey directly addresses only a subset of guilty
pleas—those made in response to a guaranteed-sentence plea offer
when a defendant is not in pretrial detention—there are reasons to
believe the results may be more broadly applicable. With regard to more
common recommended-sentence plea bargains, research suggests that
the greatest predictor of sentence duration is the prosecutor’s
recommendation even though there is greater defendant uncertainty
about the ultimate sentence a judge will assign.127 Extending the
results to “straight up” pleading, where a defendant pleads guilty
without any bargaining, is more complex. Although the defendant may
plead guilty in the hope that the judge will be more lenient at
sentencing, there is substantially greater uncertainty. This uncertainty
is likely to increase the expected cost of pleading guilty. Therefore,
communicating collateral consequences and making the full cost of
conviction apparent should make defendants less likely to waive their
right to trial.
2. Hypotheses
Responses to the survey questions are used to test four
hypotheses deriving from the discussion of the shadow of a trial theory
in Part II.
Hypothesis 1: Guilty defendants will be more likely to plead
guilty and waive the right to trial.
Hypothesis 2: Defendants will be more likely to plead guilty and
waive the right to trial as the potential post-trial sentence
increases.
Hypothesis 3: Defendants will be more likely to plead guilty and
waive the right to trial when collateral consequences are not
communicated.
Hypothesis 4: Defendants will be less likely to consider collateral
consequences when they are not explicitly disclosed.
The first two hypotheses derive from the conventional shadow of
a trial theory of plea bargaining and are likely to be relevant regardless
of whether collateral consequences are communicated.128 Even if the
theory fails to explain the universe of plea bargaining behavior, it is
likely that a defendant’s guilt informs his expectation of being convicted
at trial and increases the expected cost of going to trial, thus making a
127. Martín & Alonso, supra note 125.
128. See supra Section II.A.
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given plea offer more attractive. Similarly, as the severity of the
sentence increases, the expected cost of going to trial increases, making
a given plea offer more attractive and more likely to be accepted.
The second two hypotheses are informed by the imperfect
information and behavioral deviations from rational decisionmaking
discussed in Part II.B. Defendants are unlikely to spend much time
considering collateral consequences when the consequences are not
explicitly communicated, because defendants are either not aware of
the existence of such consequences or they are not salient during plea
negotiations if not explicitly communicated (or both). Consequently,
defendants are hypothesized to be more prone to either fail to
incorporate the cost of collateral consequences into their analysis or
narrowly frame the decision as one only about prison, making them
more likely to accept the offer. Conversely, making collateral
consequences salient may encourage defendants to update their
perception of the cost of accepting the plea offer, thus making them
more likely to make the risky decision to go to trial because the cost of
trial is less outsized relative to the offer.
B. Experiment Results
Results from the experiment demonstrate that communicating
collateral consequences is important for making plea bargain decisions.
Aggregate results across the different sentence possibilities
demonstrate that communicating collateral consequences decreases the
rate of plea acceptance. Results disaggregated by length of sentence
further reveal that communicating collateral consequences has a
greater impact when the potential sentence at trial is lower, and the
effect dissipates as the difference between the plea bargain sentence
and the sentence at trial grows larger. Finally, the results suggest that
communicating collateral consequences affects decisions by increasing
defendant awareness of the consequences. It is not possible, however,
to determine whether such increased awareness comes from
encountering new information or from making previously held
information salient in the defendant’s decisionmaking.
1. Pooled Results
To examine the overall impact of guilt and collateral
consequences on decisions to accept a plea offer, responses were pooled
across all potential sentence lengths. Figure 1 presents the pooled
results for acceptance by guilty and not guilty respondents.
Respondents assigned to a guilty condition accepted the plea offer 80%
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of the time. In contrast, respondents assigned to the not guilty condition
accepted the plea offer only 37% of the time. The difference in
acceptances between the two conditions is statistically significant.129
This result supports Hypothesis 1 that guilty defendants are more
likely to accept plea bargains. It provides some support for the shadow
of a trial theory because guilty defendants likely perceive a greater
likelihood of conviction at trial.
FIGURE 1: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – GUILT
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Guilty

Not Guilty

Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 2 presents the pooled results for acceptance based on
whether respondents received communication of collateral
consequences. Respondents who did not receive communication about
collateral consequences accepted the plea offer 65% of the time, while
respondents who did receive communication accepted the offer only 53%
of the time. This difference is statistically significant. This finding—
that respondents who receive communication about collateral
consequences are less likely to accept the offer—supports Hypothesis 4.

129. A difference is statistically significant at a given level if the probability of observing a
difference as large as the difference observed in a sample would be less than the given level if no
true effect existed. JEFFREY WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS 133–35 (5th ed. 2012).
The level at which something is significant is determined by a “p-value.” An estimate is generally
considered strongly significant at the 1% level (if p < 0.01), significant at the 5% level (if p < 0.05),
and weakly significant at the 10% level (if p < 0.10). Id.
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FIGURE 2: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
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Communicated
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Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.

2. Results by Sentence Severity
Examining the impact of communicating collateral
consequences on plea bargaining decisions across different sentence
severities provides more detailed information about the factors
influencing the respondent’s choices. It helps identify the distributional
impact of communicating collateral consequences by eliciting
information about when respondents are likely to care about collateral
consequences. Furthermore, it demonstrates the importance of the
sentence defendants can expect after conviction at trial. Figure 3
presents results on the rate of plea acceptance for each sentence
severity and condition (guilty or not guilty and collateral consequences
communicated or not communicated). Across conditions, respondents
were generally more likely to accept the plea offer as the severity of the
sentence increased, innocent respondents were less likely to accept the
plea offer, and communicating collateral consequences decreased the
rate of acceptance.
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FIGURE 3: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – SENTENCE AND CONDITION
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Figure 4 presents results for the decision to accept the plea offer
when the sentence if convicted after trial was one year. Eighty-five
percent of guilty respondents accepted the offer when collateral
consequences were not communicated and 65% accepted when they
were communicated. Among innocent respondents, 18% accepted the
offer when collateral consequences were communicated, while 28%
accepted when collateral consequences were not. Additional regression
analysis130 results reveal that communicating collateral consequences
decreased the likelihood of acceptance by about 15% (significant at the
5% level), while being guilty increased the likelihood of acceptance by
about 50% (significant at the 1% level).

130. Regression analysis is a statistical method that allows for the examination of the
relationship between multiple variables. It enables inferences about which of various factors, or
independent variables, are affecting an outcome one is interested in, the dependent variable. See
id. at 68–71.
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FIGURE 4: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – 1 YEAR
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Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 5 presents results for the decision to accept the plea offer
when the sentence if convicted after trial was three years. When
collateral consequences were not communicated, 89% of guilty
respondents accepted the plea offer and 37% of innocent respondents
accepted the plea offer. In contrast, when collateral consequences were
communicated, 75% of guilty respondents and 27% of innocent
respondents accepted the offer, respectively. Regression results
demonstrate that communicating collateral consequences decreased the
likelihood of acceptance by about 12% (significant at the 10% level),
while being guilty continued to increase the likelihood of acceptance by
about 50% (significant at the 1% level).
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FIGURE 5: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – 3 YEARS
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Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 6 presents results for the decision to accept the plea offer
when the sentence if convicted after trial was six years. When collateral
consequences were not communicated, 85% of guilty respondents
accepted the plea offer and 48% of innocent respondents accepted the
plea offer. In contrast, when collateral consequences were
communicated, 78% of guilty respondents and 39% of innocent
respondents accepted the offer. Regression results demonstrate that
communicating collateral consequences is no longer statistically
significant in determining acceptance, while being guilty increased the
likelihood of acceptance by a smaller 37% (significant at the 1% level).
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FIGURE 6: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – 6 YEARS
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Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.

Figure 7 presents results for the decision to accept the plea offer
when the sentence if convicted after trial was ten years. About 83% of
guilty respondents accepted the plea offer, regardless of communication
about collateral consequences. Among innocent respondents, 41%
accepted the offer when collateral consequences were communicated
and 57% accepted the offer when collateral consequences were not
communicated. Again, regression results demonstrate that
communicating collateral consequences was not statistically significant
in determining acceptance, while being guilty increased the likelihood
of acceptance by about 33% (significant at the 1% level).
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FIGURE 7: PLEA ACCEPTANCE – 10 YEARS
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Note: Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval.

Collectively, these results reinforce the findings from the pooled
responses. The results suggest that communicating collateral
consequences is important to ensuring that defendants are making
informed, considered decisions. The decreasing sensitivity of
respondents to collateral consequences, however, suggests that when
the trial tax or plea discount grows, we should be wary that the
resulting pleas are fair and accurate.
3. Contributing Factors
The results regarding which factors were important to
respondents’ decisions to accept or reject the plea offer provide further
evidence that communicating collateral consequences is important to
decisionmaking. Figure 8 presents the frequency of responses related to
guilt status. Across conditions, guilt was generally very important to
respondents, both motivating guilty respondents to accept the plea offer
and motivating innocent respondents to reject the plea offer.
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FIGURE 8: IMPORTANCE OF GUILT
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Figure 9 presents the frequency of responses related to jail time.
Across conditions, the possibility of jail time was also very important to
respondents, with only a handful of respondents rating it as either
somewhat important or important and very few respondents rating it
not very important.
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FIGURE 9: IMPORTANCE OF JAIL TIME
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Figure 10 presents the frequency of responses related to wanting
to put the issue behind them. The importance of this factor appears to
be very individually driven, with responses similar across all
conditions.
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FIGURE 10: IMPORTANCE OF PUTTING THE ISSUE BEHIND YOU
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Did not
consider
Not Guilty CC

Not very
important

Somewhat
important

Not Guilty No CC

Important
Guilty CC

Very important
Guilty No CC

Figure 11 presents the frequency of responses related to losing
one’s nursing license. Among both innocent and guilty respondents,
communicating collateral consequences had a significant impact on how
important they considered this factor to be. This pattern supports
Hypothesis 4—that individuals do not pay attention to collateral
consequences, either because they are unaware of them or inattentive
to them, unless the consequences are explicitly communicated. Further,
it provides evidence that the mechanism driving differences in
acceptance rates is indeed communication of collateral consequences.
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FIGURE 11: IMPORTANCE OF LOSING NURSING LICENSE
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Figure 12 presents frequency of the responses related to losing
other benefits. Similar to the trend above, among both innocent and
guilty respondents, communicating collateral consequences had a
significant impact on how important they found this factor. This
provides further support for Hypothesis 4 and the finding that
communicating collateral consequences is important for plea bargain
acceptance decisions.
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FIGURE 12: IMPORTANCE OF LOSING OTHER BENEFITS
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IV. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS
The experimental findings provide evidence of two important
outcomes related to plea bargaining and collateral consequences. First,
communicating collateral consequences matters—respondents were
significantly more likely to exercise their right to trial when collateral
consequences were communicated as part of the plea bargain offer.
Second, the effect of communicating collateral consequences dissipates
when the difference between the plea offer sentence and the potential
sentence at trial grows larger. Recognizing that plea bargaining is
entrenched in the justice system, this Part suggests one way to mitigate
unfair and inaccurate results stemming from unaddressed
shortcomings of the shadow of a trial theory of plea bargaining.131 The
Supreme Court should find that failing to communicate relevant
collateral consequences constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
under the Strickland standard.132
Requiring communication of collateral consequences by counsel
has several advantages. First, requiring judges to explain the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea would require overturning the wellestablished precedent in Brady that judges need only communicate the

131. See sources cited supra note 107.
132. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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direct consequences of guilty plea.133 Second, counsel has the
opportunity to communicate collateral consequences to defendants in
conditions much more conducive to considered reflection than judges.
When defendants are at the stage of entering a guilty plea, they are
more likely to have locked in their decision than when they are merely
considering such a plea in the context of plea bargaining.
The Supreme Court has already laid the groundwork needed to
ensure that defendants understand the collateral consequences
associated with a guilty plea. In McMann, the Court held that
defendants have a right to competent legal advice regarding guilty
pleas.134 In Hill, the Court extended the two-prong test for ineffective
counsel developed in Strickland to guilty pleas and clarified that
prejudice in the plea context is demonstrated when there is “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant]
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.”135 And in Padilla, the Court emphasized the “weight of prevailing
professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her
client regarding the risk of deportation” and the ease of determining the
consequence of deportation while casting doubt on the notion that the
“distinction between direct and collateral consequences . . . define[s]
the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance.’ ”136 In
light of this precedent, the Court should adopt a straightforward
application of the Strickland standard and explicitly reject the test
distinguishing between direct and collateral consequences still used by
most lower courts.137
As the Court recognized in Padilla, the first prong of
Strickland—whether counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness—is measured against “prevailing professional
norms.”138 In reaching its decision in the case, the Court reiterated its
long-held practice of relying on “American Bar Association standards

133. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
134. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (holding that “a defendant’s plea of
guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground
that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession”).
135. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to guilty pleas);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88 (determining whether counsel was ineffective based on (1) whether
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) whether
counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense”).
136. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365, 367 (2010).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty
plea is valid when the defendant was unaware of the collateral consequence of civil commitment);
United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a guilty plea is valid
where defendants are unaware of collateral consequences such as the loss of benefits).
138. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.
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and the like” as guides for determining what is reasonable.139 The ABA
Criminal Justice Standards provide:
Defense counsel should identify, and advise the client of, collateral consequences that may
arise from charge, plea or conviction. Counsel should investigate consequences under
applicable federal, state, and local laws, and seek assistance from others with greater
knowledge in specialized areas in order to be adequately informed as to the existence and
details of relevant collateral consequences. Such advice should be provided sufficiently in
advance that it may be fairly considered in a decision to pursue trial, plea, or other
dispositions.140

Further, the responsibilities contemplated in the ABA standards are
consistent with other materials and guides predating the current ABA
standards, demonstrating that this professional norm is well
established.141 In its opinion, the Court also noted the ease with which
counsel could determine the deportation consequences at issue in
Padilla.142 The advent of the National Inventory of Collateral
Consequences Inventory makes determination of all collateral
consequences easily accessible to counsel and supports extension of
Padilla’s reasoning to other collateral consequences.143
Fears regarding significant increases in ineffective assistance of
counsel claims resulting from subjecting communication of collateral
consequences to the effective assistance of counsel requirements of
Strickland are tempered by the second prong of the test, a showing of
prejudice.144 As the Court recognized in Padilla, history teaches that
pleas are infrequently the subject of collateral challenges relative to
trial convictions; although “[p]leas account for nearly 95% of all
criminal convictions . . . they account for only approximately 30% of the
habeas petitions filed.”145 Indeed, the standard for prejudice announced
in Hill—“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial”—is likely self-enforcing, for a defendant who collaterally
attacks his guilty plea seeks to trade the benefit of the bargain for a
trial.146 Indeed, such disclosure brings the decision to accept a plea offer
more in line with the theory underlying the shadow of a trial theory.
Individuals who would have accepted the plea bargain with full

139. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366.
140. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-5.4 (2015).
141. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 83, at 714–17.
142. 559 U.S. at 368.
143. See Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 8.
144. 466 U.S. at 687–88.
145. 559 U.S. at 372.
146. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the Strickland test to guilty pleas); see
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (“Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the
bargain obtained as a result of the plea.”).
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information about collateral consequences in the first instance should
not be expected to seek a trial, but those who would have rejected the
plea offer given full information will be given their opportunity for trial.
Thus, an earnest application of precedent should lead the Court to
require communication of collateral consequences, and concerns that
doing so will open the gate to an unprecedented number of challenges
should not be overstated.
CONCLUSION
The overwhelming majority of criminal convictions in the United
States are obtained through guilty pleas, yet the system of justice
overwhelmingly protects the rights of defendants who participate in
trials, not plea bargaining. The Supreme Court has historically relied
on an erroneous, or at the very least, incomplete, theory of what
motivates defendants to accept plea offers. As the experimental
outcomes in this Note demonstrate, communicating collateral
consequences is important to ensure that defendants are making
informed decisions when accepting a plea bargain offer.
Communicating collateral consequences to defendants at the plea
bargaining stage is an important step in protecting the rights of
defendants, but a modest one. As Edkins and Dervan’s research
demonstrates, in cases of pretrial detention defendants’ desire to be
released immediately may induce guilty pleas despite such
communication. And, as the study in this Note demonstrates, when the
potential sentence at trial grows very large, such communication is
unlikely to influence defendant decisionmaking, making broad
prosecutorial charging discretion problematic.
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